Combining Monetary and Social Sanctions to Promote Cooperation.
We employ an experimental approach to consider the impact of a combination of formal and informal sanctions on contribution levels for a specific type of public good. We find that when both sanctions are available, contributions and overall welfare are higher than when only one of the two sanctionin...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 43; no. 3; pp. 649 - 661 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
July 2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | We employ an experimental approach to consider the impact of a combination of formal and informal sanctions on contribution levels for a specific type of public good. We find that when both sanctions are available, contributions and overall welfare are higher than when only one of the two sanctioning systems is available. The availability of an array of sanctions of varying severity appears to enhance welfare. (JEL C92) Reprinted by permission of the publisher. |
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