Combining Monetary and Social Sanctions to Promote Cooperation.
We employ an experimental approach to consider the impact of a combination of formal and informal sanctions on contribution levels for a specific type of public good. We find that when both sanctions are available, contributions and overall welfare are higher than when only one of the two sanctionin...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 43; no. 3; pp. 649 - 661 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
July 2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510427628&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510427628 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: July 2005 vid: 43 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510427628 10.1093/ei/cbi045 ppf: 649 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 942KB tig: atl: Combining Monetary and Social Sanctions to Promote Cooperation. aug: au: Noussair, Charles Tucker, Steven su: Library cooperation Economic sanctions Mathematical models Social control sug: subj: Library cooperation Economic sanctions Mathematical models Social control ab: We employ an experimental approach to consider the impact of a combination of formal and informal sanctions on contribution levels for a specific type of public good. We find that when both sanctions are available, contributions and overall welfare are higher than when only one of the two sanctioning systems is available. The availability of an array of sanctions of varying severity appears to enhance welfare. (JEL C92) Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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