| Summary: | We examine strategic behavior in groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources in the American West. Solving a dynamic common-pool resource model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments. Three forms of legal rules—common-pool depletion with a “rule-of-capture” to establish ownership (absolute ownership doctrine), entry restrictions (prior appropriation doctrine), and stock quotas (correlative rights doctrine)—are examined in terms of their impact on individual strategic behavior in laboratory experiments. Reprinted by permission of Western Economic International, 7400 Center Ave., Ste. 109, Huntington Beach, CA 92647-3039 USA, Ph. 1-714-898-3222, Fax 1-714-891-6715, E-mail [|Wu]info@weainternational.org[|WU] [|Wu]http://www.weainternational.org[|WU]
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