Governing a groundwater commons: a strategic and laboratory analysis of Western water law.
We examine strategic behavior in groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources in the American West. Solving a dynamic common-pool resource model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laborat...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 35; pp. 218 - 235 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
April 1997
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510554614&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510554614 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: April 1997 vid: 35 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510554614 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb01905.x ppf: 218 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: T tig: atl: Governing a groundwater commons: a strategic and laboratory analysis of Western water law. aug: au: Gardner, Roy Moore, Michael R. Walker, James M. su: Groundwater Supply & demand Commons dilemma game Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Externalities Rent (Economic theory) Water rights Water supply West (U.S.) sug: subj: West (U.S.) Groundwater Supply & demand Commons dilemma game Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Externalities Rent (Economic theory) Water rights Water supply ab: We examine strategic behavior in groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources in the American West. Solving a dynamic common-pool resource model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments. Three forms of legal rules—common-pool depletion with a “rule-of-capture” to establish ownership (absolute ownership doctrine), entry restrictions (prior appropriation doctrine), and stock quotas (correlative rights doctrine)—are examined in terms of their impact on individual strategic behavior in laboratory experiments. Reprinted by permission of Western Economic International, 7400 Center Ave., Ste. 109, Huntington Beach, CA 92647-3039 USA, Ph. 1-714-898-3222, Fax 1-714-891-6715, E-mail [|Wu]info@weainternational.org[|WU] [|Wu]http://www.weainternational.org[|WU] pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|