Voting, Punishment, and Public goods.

Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting rule with and without endogenous pu...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Economic Inquiry Vol. 45; no. 3; pp. 557 - 571
Autores principales:	Kroll, Stephan, Cherry, Todd L., Shogren, Jason F.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell July 2007
Materias:	Mathematical models of consumption Public goods Punishment Voting Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost