Voting, Punishment, and Public goods.
Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting rule with and without endogenous pu...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 45; no. 3; pp. 557 - 571 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
July 2007
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510654646&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510654646 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: July 2007 vid: 45 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510654646 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00028.x ppf: 557 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Voting, Punishment, and Public goods. aug: au: Kroll, Stephan Cherry, Todd L. Shogren, Jason F. su: Mathematical models of consumption Public goods Punishment Voting Mathematical models sug: subj: Mathematical models of consumption Public goods Punishment Voting Mathematical models ab: Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting rule with and without endogenous punishment increases contributions to a public good. Our results suggest that voting by itself does not increase cooperation, but if voters can punish violators, contributions increase significantly. While costly punishment increases contributions at the price of lower efficiency, overall efficiency for a voting-with-punishment rule still exceeds the level observed for a voting-without-punishment rule. (JEL C92, D72, H41) Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|