Collusion Facilitating and Collusion Breaking Power of Simultaneous Ascending and Descending Price Auctions.
This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a “collusion incubator” environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a d...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 47; no. 3; pp. 395 - 425 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
July 2009
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=510823481&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 510823481 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: July 2009 vid: 47 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 510823481 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00153.x ppf: 395 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 2MB tig: atl: Collusion Facilitating and Collusion Breaking Power of Simultaneous Ascending and Descending Price Auctions. aug: au: Brown, Alexander L. Plott, Charles R. Sullivan, Heidi J. su: Price fixing Mathematical models of pricing Auctions Mathematical models sug: subj: Price fixing Mathematical models of pricing Auctions Mathematical models ab: This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a “collusion incubator” environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions. These theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion. The experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator. Then, once the tacit collusion developed, changing to the descending auction. The change moved prices from collusive levels to near-competitive levels. (JEL C71, C92, D43, D44) Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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