Collusion Facilitating and Collusion Breaking Power of Simultaneous Ascending and Descending Price Auctions.

This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a “collusion incubator” environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a d...

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Publicado en:	Economic Inquiry Vol. 47; no. 3; pp. 395 - 425
Autores principales:	Brown, Alexander L., Plott, Charles R., Sullivan, Heidi J.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell July 2009
Materias:	Price fixing Mathematical models of pricing Auctions Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost