Experimental comparisons of auctions under single- and multi-unit demand.

An English clock auction and a sealed-bid auction with lowest accepted-bid pricing are studied in a controlled laboratory setting. Buyers bid for either a single unit or two units of the good. The sealed-bid auction generates more revenue than the English clock auction in both cases. The revenue f...

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Published in:Economic Inquiry Vol. 36; pp. 87 - 98
Main Authors: Alsemgeest, Paul, Noussair, Charles, Olson, Mark
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell January 1998
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01697.x
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        atl: Experimental comparisons of auctions under single- and multi-unit demand.
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          Alsemgeest, Paul
          Noussair, Charles
          Olson, Mark
      su:
        Auctions
        Experimental design
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          Auctions
          Experimental design
      ab: An English clock auction and a sealed-bid auction with lowest accepted-bid pricing are studied in a controlled laboratory setting. Buyers bid for either a single unit or two units of the good. The sealed-bid auction generates more revenue than the English clock auction in both cases. The revenue from the English clock auction is lower in the two-unit demand environment than in the single-unit demand environment, due to strategic demand reduction on the part of bidders. Reprinted by permission of Western Economic International, 7400 Center Ave., Ste. 109, Huntington Beach, CA 92647-3039 USA, Ph. 1-714-898-3222, Fax 1-714-891-6715, E-mail [|Wu]info@weainternational.org[|WU] [|Wu]http://www.weainternational.org[|WU]
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