Animals, Agency, and Obligation in Kantian Ethics.
The writer examines efforts to defend, supplement, and amend Immanuel Kant's account of obligations to animals. She argues that nonrevisionist efforts to derive a robust account of obligations to animals create only the appearance of moral concern for animals. She further argues that revisionist s...
| Publicado en: | Social Theory & Practice Vol. 35; no. 4; pp. 531 - 555 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Florida State University, Dept. of Philosophy
October 2009
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The writer examines efforts to defend, supplement, and amend Immanuel Kant's account of obligations to animals. She argues that nonrevisionist efforts to derive a robust account of obligations to animals create only the appearance of moral concern for animals. She further argues that revisionist strategies fail to decisively overcome difficulties involved in extending the Kantian scope of moral concern to include animals. |
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