How delegating authority biases social choices.

Delegating authority can bias social choices. The bias derives from the persuasion process that accompanies social decision making. When decision makers can decide to delegate their authority, asymmetries in decision makers' persuasiveness and openness to persuasion can play an important role in d...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Contemporary Economic Policy Vol. 16; no. 4; pp. 511 - 519
Main Author: Tansey, Michael M.
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell October 1998
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Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
Description
Summary:Delegating authority can bias social choices. The bias derives from the persuasion process that accompanies social decision making. When decision makers can decide to delegate their authority, asymmetries in decision makers' persuasiveness and openness to persuasion can play an important role in distorting the outcomes of social choices. When permitted in social decision making, such ad hoc delegating may favor extreme points of view and may force more group decisions to formal, social-choice mechanisms such as voting. Reprinted by permission of Western Economic International 7400 Center Ave., Ste. 109, Huntington Beach, CA 92647–3039, USA Ph. 1–714–898–3222, Fax 1–714–891–6715 E-mail info@weainternational.org http://www.weainternational.org