How delegating authority biases social choices.
Delegating authority can bias social choices. The bias derives from the persuasion process that accompanies social decision making. When decision makers can decide to delegate their authority, asymmetries in decision makers' persuasiveness and openness to persuasion can play an important role in d...
| Published in: | Contemporary Economic Policy Vol. 16; no. 4; pp. 511 - 519 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
October 1998
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
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