Changing the social norm of tax compliance by voting.
It is suggested that there is a social norm of tax compliance that affects individual reporting decisions and that can be affected by government institutions. Experimental methods are employed to test this hypothesis: an experimental design that captures the essential features of the fiscal and vo...
| Published in: | Kyklos Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 141 - 172 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1999
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | It is suggested that there is a social norm of tax compliance that affects individual reporting decisions and that can be affected by government institutions. Experimental methods are employed to test this hypothesis: an experimental design that captures the essential features of the fiscal and voting system present in many countries is presented. Results are consistent with a central role for social norms in tax compliance behavior. However, results also suggest that the social norm of tax compliance can be affected by group communication. |
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