Changing the social norm of tax compliance by voting.
It is suggested that there is a social norm of tax compliance that affects individual reporting decisions and that can be affected by government institutions. Experimental methods are employed to test this hypothesis: an experimental design that captures the essential features of the fiscal and vo...
| Published in: | Kyklos Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 141 - 172 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1999
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511095973&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511095973 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00235962 KYK jtl: Kyklos issn: 00235962 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 1999 vid: 52 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 511095973 10.1111/1467-6435.00079 ppf: 141 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: T tig: atl: Changing the social norm of tax compliance by voting. aug: au: Alm, James McClelland, Gary H. Schulze, William D. su: Mathematical models Social norms Taxpayer compliance Voting sug: subj: Mathematical models Social norms Taxpayer compliance Voting ab: It is suggested that there is a social norm of tax compliance that affects individual reporting decisions and that can be affected by government institutions. Experimental methods are employed to test this hypothesis: an experimental design that captures the essential features of the fiscal and voting system present in many countries is presented. Results are consistent with a central role for social norms in tax compliance behavior. However, results also suggest that the social norm of tax compliance can be affected by group communication. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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