Employee discharge and reinstatement: moral hazards and the mixed consequences of last chance agreements.

The authors examine the consequences of workplace discipline practices involving the use of last chance agreements (LCAs)—contracts governing the non-arbitral reinstatement of discharged employees. Using data from one manufacturing firm's 15-year experience with LCAs, they explore the impact of LCA-...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Industrial & Labor Relations Review Vol. 53; no. 1; pp. 3 - 21
Autores principales: Bamberger, Peter A., Donahue, Linda H.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cornell University October 1999
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:The authors examine the consequences of workplace discipline practices involving the use of last chance agreements (LCAs)—contracts governing the non-arbitral reinstatement of discharged employees. Using data from one manufacturing firm's 15-year experience with LCAs, they explore the impact of LCA-based employee reinstatement on subsequent years' discharge rates. They also seek to identify individual and work-related factors predictive of individual reinstatement “success.” Consistent with moral hazard theory, the analysis shows evidence of a positive relationship between the number of LCAs signed in one year and the rate of discharge in subsequent years; and consistent with the theory of reintegrative shaming, LCAs appear to be most effective among those most susceptible to shaming. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.