On Labour Demand and Equilibria of the Firm.
The writer outlines a linear programming formulation of the problem of the firm. He derives a neoclassical non-increasing labor demand function from the solution of the linear program and states that only a set of measure zero on this function provides equilibria of the representative firm. He poi...
| Publicado en: | Manchester School (14636786) Vol. 73; no. 5; pp. 612 - 620 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
September 2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The writer outlines a linear programming formulation of the problem of the firm. He derives a neoclassical non-increasing labor demand function from the solution of the linear program and states that only a set of measure zero on this function provides equilibria of the representative firm. He points out that equilibria of the representative firm are characterized by decisions of its managers that permit the same decisions to be taken in successive periods. He suggests that it is therefore possible to explain the quantity of labor that firms seek to hire either by a traditional neoclassical labor demand function or by equilibria of the firm but generally not both. |
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