On Labour Demand and Equilibria of the Firm.

The writer outlines a linear programming formulation of the problem of the firm. He derives a neoclassical non-increasing labor demand function from the solution of the linear program and states that only a set of measure zero on this function provides equilibria of the representative firm. He poi...

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Publicado en:Manchester School (14636786) Vol. 73; no. 5; pp. 612 - 620
Autor principal: Vienneau, Robert L.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell September 2005
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: On Labour Demand and Equilibria of the Firm.
      aug:
        au: Vienneau, Robert L.
      su:
        Labor demand
        Mathematical models of job vacancies
        Linear programming
        Theory of the firm
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        subj:
          Labor demand
          Mathematical models of job vacancies
          Linear programming
          Theory of the firm
      ab: The writer outlines a linear programming formulation of the problem of the firm. He derives a neoclassical non-increasing labor demand function from the solution of the linear program and states that only a set of measure zero on this function provides equilibria of the representative firm. He points out that equilibria of the representative firm are characterized by decisions of its managers that permit the same decisions to be taken in successive periods. He suggests that it is therefore possible to explain the quantity of labor that firms seek to hire either by a traditional neoclassical labor demand function or by equilibria of the firm but generally not both.
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      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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