Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation.
This paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation. A government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors, but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors. They lobby the government for preferential treatme...
| Publicado en: | American Economic Review Vol. 96; no. 1; pp. 257 - 280 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
American Economic Association
March 2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511277887&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511277887 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00028282 AER jtl: American Economic Review issn: 00028282 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: March 2006 vid: 96 iid: 1 pid: 22 pub: American Economic Association artinfo: ui: 511277887 10.1257/000282806776157533 ppf: 257 ppct: 23 formats: tig: atl: Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation. aug: au: Esteban, Joan Ray, Debraj su: Lobbyists Lobbying Mathematical models of political participation Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Wealth Mathematical models sug: subj: Lobbyists Lobbying Mathematical models of political participation Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Wealth Mathematical models ab: This paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation. A government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors, but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors. They lobby the government for preferential treatment. The government—even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency—may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies. Broadly speaking, both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation. The paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more “corrupt.” Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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