Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments.
This paper studies the assignment of people to projects over time in a model with private information. The combination of risk neutrality with incomplete contracts that restrict the ability of an agent to report on interim states is a force for long-term assignments. More generally, however, rotatin...
| Publicado en: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 73; no. 2; pp. 531 - 549 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / UK
April 2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511282187&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511282187 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: April 2006 vid: 73 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / UK artinfo: ui: 511282187 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00386.x ppf: 531 ppct: 18 formats: tig: atl: Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments. aug: au: Prescott, Edward Simpson Townsend, Robert M. su: Assignment problems (Programming) Job rotation Information theory in economics sug: subj: Assignment problems (Programming) Job rotation Information theory in economics ab: This paper studies the assignment of people to projects over time in a model with private information. The combination of risk neutrality with incomplete contracts that restrict the ability of an agent to report on interim states is a force for long-term assignments. More generally, however, rotating agents can be valuable because it conceals information from agents, which mitigates incentive constraints. With complete contracts that communicate interim states, rotation allows for even more concealment possibilities and better-targeted incentives. Furthermore, it allows for the reporting of interim shocks at no cost to the principal. Properties of the production technology are also shown to matter. Substitutability of intertem-poral effort is a force for long-term assignments, while coordination with Nash equilibrium strategies is a force for job rotation. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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