Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information.

We incorporate multiagent, principal-agent theory into general equilibrium analysis. The traded commodities are multiagent contracts that include a description of the individual's job, effort level, and state-contingent consumption. These contracts are club goods. The competitive equilibrium and the...

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Publicado en:Journal of Political Economy Vol. 114; no. 4; pp. 644 - 672
Autores principales: Prescott, Edward Simpson, Townsend, Robert M.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: University of Chicago Press August 2006
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: August 2006
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        atl: Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information.
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        au:
          Prescott, Edward Simpson
          Townsend, Robert M.
      su:
        Theory of the firm
        Information theory in economics
        Clubs
        Economics
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        subj:
          Theory of the firm
          Information theory in economics
          Clubs
          Economics
      ab: We incorporate multiagent, principal-agent theory into general equilibrium analysis. The traded commodities are multiagent contracts that include a description of the individual's job, effort level, and state-contingent consumption. These contracts are club goods. The competitive equilibrium and the Pareto program are formulated. The contracts are identified with firms, so the market determines which firms exist and who is assigned to which firm in what capacity. An example is provided in which the internal organization of firms and the distribution of firm classes vary with the aggregate capital endowment and its distribution across agents. A simplex-based algorithm for solving the Pareto program is developed. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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    language: English
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