Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information.

We incorporate multiagent, principal-agent theory into general equilibrium analysis. The traded commodities are multiagent contracts that include a description of the individual's job, effort level, and state-contingent consumption. These contracts are club goods. The competitive equilibrium and the...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Journal of Political Economy Vol. 114; no. 4; pp. 644 - 672
Autores principales:	Prescott, Edward Simpson, Townsend, Robert M.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	University of Chicago Press August 2006
Materias:	Theory of the firm Information theory in economics Clubs Economics
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost