Political Economy of Mechanisms.

We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self-interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power create...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Econometrica Vol. 76; no. 3; pp. 619 - 642
Autores principales:	Acemoglu, Daron, Golosov, Michael, Tsyvinski, Aleh
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell May 2008
Materias:	Resource allocation > Mathematical models Economics & politics Taxation Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost