Political Economy of Mechanisms.
We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self-interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power create...
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 76; no. 3; pp. 619 - 642 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May 2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511382298&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511382298 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00129682 ECN jtl: Econometrica issn: 00129682 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May 2008 vid: 76 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 511382298 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00849.x ppf: 619 ppct: 23 formats: tig: atl: Political Economy of Mechanisms. aug: au: Acemoglu, Daron Golosov, Michael Tsyvinski, Aleh su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economics & politics Taxation Mathematical models sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economics & politics Taxation Mathematical models ab: We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self-interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power creates political economy distortions in the structure of production, which resemble aggregate tax distortions. We provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run. If the politicians are as patient as the citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear. In contrast, when politicians are less patient than the citizens, political economy distortions remain asymptotically and lead to positive aggregate labor and capital taxes. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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