Characterization of Revenue Equivalence.
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds f...
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 77; no. 1; pp. 307 - 317 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
January 2009
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. |
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