Characterization of Revenue Equivalence.
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds f...
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 77; no. 1; pp. 307 - 317 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
January 2009
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511437911&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511437911 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00129682 ECN jtl: Econometrica issn: 00129682 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: January 2009 vid: 77 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 511437911 10.3982/ECTA7168 ppf: 307 ppct: 10 formats: tig: atl: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence. aug: au: Heydenreich, Birgit Müller, Rudolf Uetz, Marc Vohra, Rakesh V. su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Game theory sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Game theory keyword: Mechanism design theory ab: The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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