Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling.
We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goo...
| Publicado en: | Economic Journal Vol. 120; pp. 786 - 800 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
June 2010
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511512074&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511512074 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00130133 EJN jtl: Economic Journal issn: 00130133 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: June 2010 vid: 120 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 511512074 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02311.x ppf: 786 ppct: 14 formats: tig: atl: Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling. aug: au: Browning, Martin Chiappori, Pierre-André Lechene, Valérie su: Households & economics Nash equilibrium Public goods Mathematical models of income Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Households & economics Nash equilibrium Public goods Mathematical models of income Resource allocation -- Mathematical models ab: We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A household will be in different regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household. Any bargaining model with this non-cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling. We conclude that targeting benefits such as child benefits to one household member may not always have an effect on outcomes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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