Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling.

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goo...

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Publicado en:	Economic Journal Vol. 120; pp. 786 - 800
Autores principales:	Browning, Martin, Chiappori, Pierre-André, Lechene, Valérie
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell June 2010
Materias:	Households & economics Nash equilibrium Public goods Mathematical models of income Resource allocation > Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost