Monotonicity and Implementability.
Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant...
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 78; no. 5; pp. 1749 - 1773 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
September 2010
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=511528547&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 511528547 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00129682 ECN jtl: Econometrica issn: 00129682 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: September 2010 vid: 78 iid: 5 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 511528547 10.3982/ECTA8882 ppf: 1749 ppct: 24 formats: tig: atl: Monotonicity and Implementability. aug: au: Ashlagi, Itai Braverman, Mark Hassidim, Avinatan Monderer, Dov su: Monotonic functions Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Monotonic functions Resource allocation -- Mathematical models ab: Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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