Monotonicity and Implementability.
Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant...
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 78; no. 5; pp. 1749 - 1773 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
September 2010
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. |
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