A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes.
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 61; pp. 1147 - 1173 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
September 1993
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
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