A necessary and sufficient condition for Walrasian social choice.
The writer discusses Walrasian resource allocations in terms of social choice axioms, each of which reflects concepts of collective rationality, ethical considerations, and/or informational constraints. Drawing on Debreu-Scarf's core convergence theory, he argues that the Walras rule is the only rul...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 62; pp. 186 - 209 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
February 1994
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The writer discusses Walrasian resource allocations in terms of social choice axioms, each of which reflects concepts of collective rationality, ethical considerations, and/or informational constraints. Drawing on Debreu-Scarf's core convergence theory, he argues that the Walras rule is the only rule satisfying the core property, non-discrimination, generalized monotonicity, and local decisiveness. |
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