A necessary and sufficient condition for Walrasian social choice.
The writer discusses Walrasian resource allocations in terms of social choice axioms, each of which reflects concepts of collective rationality, ethical considerations, and/or informational constraints. Drawing on Debreu-Scarf's core convergence theory, he argues that the Walras rule is the only rul...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 62; pp. 186 - 209 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
February 1994
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512388443&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512388443 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: February 1994 vid: 62 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 512388443 10.1006/jeth.1994.1010 ppf: 186 ppct: 23 formats: tig: atl: A necessary and sufficient condition for Walrasian social choice. aug: au: Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Core & periphery (Economic theory) Social choice Mathematical models sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Core & periphery (Economic theory) Social choice Mathematical models ab: The writer discusses Walrasian resource allocations in terms of social choice axioms, each of which reflects concepts of collective rationality, ethical considerations, and/or informational constraints. Drawing on Debreu-Scarf's core convergence theory, he argues that the Walras rule is the only rule satisfying the core property, non-discrimination, generalized monotonicity, and local decisiveness. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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