Aid conditionality and military expenditure reduction in developing countries: models of asymmetric information.

A study was conducted to examine problems of implementing noneconomic conditionality, such as military expenditure reduction, in the granting of foreign aid in the presence of asymmetric information. Two conceptually separate principal-agent models are presented in order to capture the stylized fact...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	Economic Journal Vol. 105; pp. 498 - 510
Main Authors:	Murshed, S. Mansoob, Sen, Somnath
Format:	Article
Published:	Wiley-Blackwell March 1995
Subjects:	Moral hazard Agency theory Mathematical models International economic assistance Resource allocation > Mathematical models International economic assistance > Developing countries Military budgets Developing countries Information theory in economics Adverse selection (Insurance)
Online Access:	View this record in EBSCOhost