Aid conditionality and military expenditure reduction in developing countries: models of asymmetric information.

A study was conducted to examine problems of implementing noneconomic conditionality, such as military expenditure reduction, in the granting of foreign aid in the presence of asymmetric information. Two conceptually separate principal-agent models are presented in order to capture the stylized fact...

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Publicado en:	Economic Journal Vol. 105; pp. 498 - 510
Autores principales:	Murshed, S. Mansoob, Sen, Somnath
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell March 1995
Materias:	Moral hazard Agency theory Mathematical models International economic assistance Resource allocation > Mathematical models International economic assistance > Developing countries Military budgets Developing countries Information theory in economics Adverse selection (Insurance)
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost