A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules.
The writers demonstrate that the maximal domain, including single-peaked preferences for strategy-proofness, efficiency, and symmetry, is unique and slightly larger than the single-peaked domain. They argue that this finding shows that the assumption of single-peakedness essentially cannot be weaken...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 78; no. 1; pp. 157 - 167 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Academic Press Inc.
January 1998
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The writers demonstrate that the maximal domain, including single-peaked preferences for strategy-proofness, efficiency, and symmetry, is unique and slightly larger than the single-peaked domain. They argue that this finding shows that the assumption of single-peakedness essentially cannot be weakened if one insists on strategy-proofness, together with the distributional requirement of symmetry and the optimality requirement of efficiency. They contend that this result can be alternatively understood as a general impossibility theorem. |
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