A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules.
The writers demonstrate that the maximal domain, including single-peaked preferences for strategy-proofness, efficiency, and symmetry, is unique and slightly larger than the single-peaked domain. They argue that this finding shows that the assumption of single-peakedness essentially cannot be weaken...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 78; no. 1; pp. 157 - 167 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
January 1998
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512595966&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512595966 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: January 1998 vid: 78 iid: 1 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 512595966 10.1006/jeth.1997.2337 ppf: 157 ppct: 10 formats: tig: atl: A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules. aug: au: Ching, Stephen Serizawa, Shigehiro su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Consumer preferences Mathematical models sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Consumer preferences Mathematical models ab: The writers demonstrate that the maximal domain, including single-peaked preferences for strategy-proofness, efficiency, and symmetry, is unique and slightly larger than the single-peaked domain. They argue that this finding shows that the assumption of single-peakedness essentially cannot be weakened if one insists on strategy-proofness, together with the distributional requirement of symmetry and the optimality requirement of efficiency. They contend that this result can be alternatively understood as a general impossibility theorem. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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