Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance.
The writers describe the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and where full insurance is prevented by issues of moral hazard. They present a model of the long-run consequences of efficient unemployment insurance for th...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 66; pp. 64 - 89 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Academic Press Inc.
June 1995
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512627287&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512627287 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: June 1995 vid: 66 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 512627287 10.1006/jeth.1995.1032 ppf: 64 ppct: 25 formats: tig: atl: Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance. aug: au: Atkeson, Andrew Lucas, Robert E. su: Utility theory Moral hazard Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Consumption (Economics) Agency theory Risk Unemployment insurance Mathematical models sug: subj: Utility theory Moral hazard Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Consumption (Economics) Agency theory Risk Unemployment insurance Mathematical models ab: The writers describe the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and where full insurance is prevented by issues of moral hazard. They present a model of the long-run consequences of efficient unemployment insurance for the distribution of welfare and consumption for these workers, define the efficiency problem, and establish the connection between the original efficiency problem and a one-on-one principal-agent problem. They consider the solution to the one-on-one principal-agent problem, examine the Markov process of entitlements generated by the solution to this problem, and demonstrate that the steady-state level of resource use is a continuous, increasing function of the interest rate, thereby establishing the existence of a market clearing interest rate. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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