Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance.

The writers describe the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and where full insurance is prevented by issues of moral hazard. They present a model of the long-run consequences of efficient unemployment insurance for th...

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Publicado en:	Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 66; pp. 64 - 89
Autores principales:	Atkeson, Andrew, Lucas, Robert E.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Academic Press Inc. June 1995
Materias:	Utility theory Moral hazard Resource allocation > Mathematical models Consumption (Economics) Agency theory Risk Unemployment insurance Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost