Bargaining with surplus destruction.

In a two-player alternating-offer bargaining model, if one player can destroy the surplus to be allocated, then the value to bargain for is endogenous, except at the beginning. Even with complete information, the model has perfect equilibria with delayed agreement and/or surplus destruction. The m...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Canadian Journal of Economics Vol. 31; no. 4; pp. 915 - 933
Autores principales:	Busch, Lutz-Alexander, Shi, Shouyong, Wen, Quan
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell October 1998
Materias:	Economics Game theory Resource allocation > Mathematical models Economic equilibrium Information theory in economics Surplus (Economics) Negotiation Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost