Bargaining with surplus destruction.
In a two-player alternating-offer bargaining model, if one player can destroy the surplus to be allocated, then the value to bargain for is endogenous, except at the beginning. Even with complete information, the model has perfect equilibria with delayed agreement and/or surplus destruction. The m...
| Publicado en: | Canadian Journal of Economics Vol. 31; no. 4; pp. 915 - 933 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
October 1998
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512711643&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512711643 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00084085 CJE jtl: Canadian Journal of Economics issn: 00084085 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 1998 vid: 31 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 512711643 10.2307/136500 ppf: 915 ppct: 18 formats: tig: atl: Bargaining with surplus destruction. aug: au: Busch, Lutz-Alexander Shi, Shouyong Wen, Quan su: Economics Game theory Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economic equilibrium Information theory in economics Surplus (Economics) Negotiation Mathematical models sug: subj: Economics Game theory Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economic equilibrium Information theory in economics Surplus (Economics) Negotiation Mathematical models ab: In a two-player alternating-offer bargaining model, if one player can destroy the surplus to be allocated, then the value to bargain for is endogenous, except at the beginning. Even with complete information, the model has perfect equilibria with delayed agreement and/or surplus destruction. The model therefore explains inefficiency and destruction that may appear irrational. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and its limiting behaviour as the time between offers vanishes. Real time delay remains possible even in the limit. We also consider the case of surplus destruction that is exogenously limited by the time between offers. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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