| Sumario: | The writers examine fair division rules in a global economy framework consisting of many local environments with fixed, non-disposable, perfectly divisible endowments and possibly different division rules and that allow migration by individuals. They analyze whether or not there exists a migration equilibrium, that is, some global population distribution such that no individual has an incentive to migrate to another local economy. In the framework they employ, the rules must satisfy not only the desirable properties of Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and envy-freeness, but also stability. However, their findings revealed that stability for all preference profiles is incompatible with each combination of two of these desirable properties. The writers state that in previous analyses, they have obtained some positive results on the existence of migration equilibria for some very special circumstances, more vulnerability results for rules with other desirable properties, and stronger vulnerability results for specific division rules.
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