Division rules and migration equilibria.
The writers examine fair division rules in a global economy framework consisting of many local environments with fixed, non-disposable, perfectly divisible endowments and possibly different division rules and that allow migration by individuals. They analyze whether or not there exists a migration...
| Published in: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 69; pp. 104 - 117 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Academic Press Inc.
April 1996
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512770279&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512770279 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: April 1996 vid: 69 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 512770279 10.1006/jeth.1996.0039 ppf: 104 ppct: 13 formats: tig: atl: Division rules and migration equilibria. aug: au: Gensemer, Susan Hong, Lu Kelly, Jerry S. su: Emigration & immigration Mathematical models Economic equilibrium Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Emigration & immigration Mathematical models Economic equilibrium Resource allocation -- Mathematical models ab: The writers examine fair division rules in a global economy framework consisting of many local environments with fixed, non-disposable, perfectly divisible endowments and possibly different division rules and that allow migration by individuals. They analyze whether or not there exists a migration equilibrium, that is, some global population distribution such that no individual has an incentive to migrate to another local economy. In the framework they employ, the rules must satisfy not only the desirable properties of Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and envy-freeness, but also stability. However, their findings revealed that stability for all preference profiles is incompatible with each combination of two of these desirable properties. The writers state that in previous analyses, they have obtained some positive results on the existence of migration equilibria for some very special circumstances, more vulnerability results for rules with other desirable properties, and stronger vulnerability results for specific division rules. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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