Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies.
In his pioneering article, (in “Decision and Organization” (C.B. McGuire and R.Radner, Eds.), pp.297–336, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1972) Hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods, p...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 106; no. 2; pp. 219 - 242 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
October 2002
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513153346&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513153346 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 2002 vid: 106 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513153346 10.1006/jeth.2002.2940 ppf: 219 ppct: 23 formats: tig: atl: Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies. aug: au: Serizawa, Shigehiro su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Welfare economics Mathematical models of economics Exchange Mathematical models sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Welfare economics Mathematical models of economics Exchange Mathematical models ab: In his pioneering article, (in “Decision and Organization” (C.B. McGuire and R.Radner, Eds.), pp.297–336, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1972) Hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods, provided that the domain includes a sufficiently wide class of classical preferences. In this article, we extend his result to pure exchange economies with any finite number of agents and goods. We establish that (i) there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule on the class of classical, homothetic, and smooth preferences; and (ii) there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and symmetric rule on the same class of preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D78, D71, C72. |Sc 2002 Elsevier Science (USA) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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