Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies.

In his pioneering article, (in “Decision and Organization” (C.B. McGuire and R.Radner, Eds.), pp.297–336, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1972) Hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods, p...

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Publicado en:	Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 106; no. 2; pp. 219 - 242
Autor principal:	Serizawa, Shigehiro
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Academic Press Inc. October 2002
Materias:	Resource allocation > Mathematical models Welfare economics Mathematical models of economics Exchange Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost