Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility.
We examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility...
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 70; no. 6; pp. 2421 - 2454 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
November 2002
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513157363&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513157363 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00129682 ECN jtl: Econometrica issn: 00129682 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: November 2002 vid: 70 iid: 6 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 513157363 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2002.00444.x ppf: 2421 ppct: 33 formats: tig: atl: Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility. aug: au: McLean, Richard Postlewaite, Andrew su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Information theory in economics sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Information theory in economics ab: We examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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