Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility.
We examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility...
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 70; no. 6; pp. 2421 - 2454 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
November 2002
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | We examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. |
|---|