Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills.
In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w.r.t. technological innovations, so that the non-welfaristic characterizations o...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 108; no. 2; pp. 256 - 286 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
February 2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w.r.t. technological innovations, so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions) from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dworkin. Copyright (c) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA) |
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