Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills.
In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w.r.t. technological innovations, so that the non-welfaristic characterizations o...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 108; no. 2; pp. 256 - 286 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
February 2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513167389&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513167389 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: February 2003 vid: 108 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513167389 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00026-7 ppf: 256 ppct: 30 formats: tig: atl: Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills. aug: au: Yoshihara, Naoki su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Skilled labor Mathematical models Negotiation sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Skilled labor Mathematical models Negotiation ab: In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w.r.t. technological innovations, so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions) from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dworkin. Copyright (c) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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