Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods.
We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure nee...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 115; no. 2; pp. 358 - 377 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Academic Press Inc.
April 2004
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings. Copyright (c) 2003 Elsevier (USA) |
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