Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods.

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure nee...

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Publicado en:Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 115; no. 2; pp. 358 - 377
Autores principales: Echenique, Federico, Oviedo, Jorge
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Academic Press Inc. April 2004
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      pub: Academic Press Inc.
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        513171310
        10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00184-4
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        atl: Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods.
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          Echenique, Federico
          Oviedo, Jorge
      su:
        Algorithms
        Nonlinear programming
        Core & periphery (Economic theory)
        Matching theory
      sug:
        subj:
          Algorithms
          Nonlinear programming
          Core & periphery (Economic theory)
          Matching theory
      ab: We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings. Copyright (c) 2003 Elsevier (USA)
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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